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Appellant, FMA Leasing Company ("FMA"), by and through 
its undersigned counsel of record and pursuant to rule 24 of 
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, submits the following 
brief in reply to the Brief of Respondent Fidelity National Title 
Insurance Company (hereinafter Brief of Respondent). 
INTRODUCTION 
FMA conveyed the property that was the subject of this 
action to Alta Ridge Associates ("Alta Ridge") by special warranty 
deed. When Citizens Bank asserted an interest in the property, 
FMA brought this action to have Citizens Bank's claim invalidated 
and title quieted in Alta Ridge. Alta Ridge's title insurer 
joined as a plaintiff, in the name of Alta Ridge (as it was en-
titled to do under its title insurance policy). The plaintiffs 
were successful, and title was quieted in Alta Ridge. The trial 
court then granted summary judgment to Alta Ridge's title in-
surer, the appellee, Fidelity National Title Insurance Company 
("Fidelity"), on Alta Ridge's cross-claim against FMA and awarded 
Fidelity its attorney fees incurred in this action.1 
1
 In its Statement of the Case, Fidelity states that 
the trust deed in favor of Citizens Bank's assignor, 4-Seasons, 
was given by the former owner of the property, Dale Morgan, to 
secure a portion of the purchase price. Mr. Morgan testified 
and the jury found that Mr. Morgan did not receive any considera-
tion for the trust deed note that he gave to 4-Seasons. Record 
at 1114-15 & 843. 
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SUMMARY OF REPLY 
FMA's appeal is timely because its notice of appeal 
was filed within the extended time allowed by the trial court 
under rule 4(e) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court. (Point 
I.) 
Fidelity has failed to show either that FMA warranted 
against Citizens Bank's claim when it gave Alta Ridge a special 
warranty deed (Point II) or, if it did, that FMA breached any 
covenant stated or implied in the special warranty deed (Point 
III). Moreover, Fidelity has failed to show any basis for an 
award of attorney fees under principles of subrogation. (Point 
IV.) Finally, FMA's third-party complaint against Fidelity pre-
cluded summary judgment in Fidelity's favor. (Point V.) 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
FMA'S APPEAL IS TIMELY. 
Fidelity argues that FMA's appeal should be dismissed 
because its notice of appeal was untimely.2 The order from which 
FMA has appealed was entered on March 31, 1989. Record at 1929-
31. FMA first filed a notice of appeal on May 4, 1989. Jd. at 
1932. A notice of appeal is required to be filed within thirty 
2
 FMA first became aware of this argument in July 1989, 
when it received a copy of this court's notice that Fidelity's 
motion for summary disposition had been denied. FMA never re-
ceived a copy of the motion for summary disposition. 
• 2 -
days after the date of entry of the order appealed from. R. 
Utah S. Ct. 4(a).3 FMA's notice of appeal filed on May 4, 1989, 
would have been untimely. However, the district court, "upon a 
showing of excusable neglect or good cause, may extend the time 
for filing a notice of appeal upon motion filed not later than 
30 days after the expiration of the time prescribed by" rule 
4(a). Id. 4(e). On May 4, 1989, well within the thirty days 
allowed by rule 4(e), FMA filed a motion to extend the time for 
filing its notice of appeal. Record at 1939-40. On May 12, 
1989, the trial court granted the motion, allowing FMA an addi-
tional thirty days, to May 30, 1989, to file its notice of appeal. 
Record at 1949-50; see Addendum. Fidelity did not appeal from 
the trial court's order extending the time to appeal, and, on 
May 26, 1989, within the extended time allowed by the trial court, 
FMA filed a new notice of appeal. See Addendum. FMA's second 
notice of appeal was clearly timely under rule 4, and this court 
thus has jurisdiction to hear this appeal. 
II. 
FMA DID NOT BREACH ITS DEED WARRANTIES, 
The central issue in this appeal is whether the trial 
court erred in awarding Fidelity its attorney's fees incurred 
3
 FMA's notice of appeal is governed by rule 4 of the 
now superseded Rules of the Utah Supreme Court. The new Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, which became effective April 1, 
1990, would not change the result. See Utah R. App. P. 4. 
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in successfully defending a claim of adverse title brought against 
its insured, Alta Ridge. Fidelity's only claim against FMA is 
a subrogation claim.4 Fidelity claims that it is subrogated to 
the rights of its insured, Alta Ridge. Thus, Fidelity has a 
claim against FMA for its attorney's fees only if Alta Ridge 
would have such a claim. And the only basis for such a claim 
that the trial court found was that FMA breached its warranties 
under the Special Warranty Deed that it gave Alta Ridge. 
A special warranty deed only warrants title against 
certain persons or claims. Central Life Assur. Assoc, v. 
Impelmans, 13 Wash. 2d 632, 126 P.2d 757, 763 (1942). Under 
the Special Warranty Deed in this case, FMA only warranted title 
"against all claiming by, through, or under it." See Brief of 
Respondent addenda at 25. Such a warranty "protects the grantee 
against a claim under a title from his grantor, but not against 
a claim under a title against, or superior to, his grantor." 
Id. at 763 (emphasis in original). See also 6A R. Powell, The 
Law of Real Property I 900[2][d] at 81A-141 (rev. ed. 1989) 
("Under a special warranty, if the claim arose under, or due to 
the actions of, a prior owner of the land, the covenantor has 
no liability-) (footnote omitted). 
4
 Fidelity does not claim that FMA owed it any duty, and, 
in fact, the only relationship between FMA and Fidelity is that 
FMA paid the premium for the title insurance policy that Fidel-
ity's agent issued to Alta Ridge, FMA's grantee. 
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Citizens Bank's claim was not a claim under title from 
FMA, Rather, was based upon an assignment of a trust deed given 
to a third party (4-Seasons) by FMA's predecessor, Dale Morgan. 
Thus, it was a claim "under a title against, or superior to," 
FMA's that "arose under . . . a prior owner of the land," and 
FMA did not warrant against it.5 
Fidelity tries to avoid this difficulty by arguing 
that FMA warranted against any encumbrances "suffered" by FMA 
(citing Impelmans, 126 P.2d 757) and that FMA "suffered" Citizens 
Bank's claim by its actions or failure to act. This argument 
must fail because there is no evidence that FMA "suffered" any 
encumbrance created by the assignment from 4-Seasons to Citi-
zens Bank. 
The law is clear that one does not "suffer" matters 
of which it has no knowledge. The word "suffer" necessarily 
implies knowledge. Nolde Bros., Inc. v. Chalklev, 184 Va. 553, 
35 S.E.2d 827, 832-33 (Va. 1945) (citing Clover Creamery Co. v. 
Kanode, 142 Va. 542, 129 S.E. 222 (1925)); Black's Law Dictionary 
5
 Other courts have stated that a grantor under a special 
warranty deed is only liable if the grantee's ownership "is dis-
turbed by some claim arising through an act of the grantor." 
Stracka v. Peterson, 377 N.W.2d 580, 583 n.6 (N.D. 1985) (emphasis 
added). Citizens Bank's claim did not arise through any act of 
FMA. Its claim arose through the acts of third parties, namely 
Dale Morgan and 4-Seasons, to which FMA was not a party and of 
which it had no knowledge. 
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1284 (5th ed. 1979). See also Arizona Title Ins. & Trust Co. 
v. Smith, 21 Ariz. App. 371, 519 P.2d 860, 863 (1974) ("suffered" 
implies a failure to prohibit or prevent an encumbrance with 
full knowledge that the encumbrance is to be created and with 
the intention that it be created); First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. 
v. New York Title Ins. Co., 171 Misc. 854, 12 N.Y.S. 2d 703, 709 
(1939) (to "suffer" an act implies the power to prohibit or pre-
vent it and includes knowledge of what is to be done with the 
intention that it be done); Feldman v. Urban Commercial, Inc., 
87 N.J. Super. 391, 209 A.2d 640, 648 (1965) (accord). Cf. United 
States v. Launder, 743 F.2d 686, 689 (9th Cir. 1984) (accord, 
construing criminal statute). 
It is undisputed that FMA did not know about 4-Sea-
sons ' assignment to Citizens Bank, much less that it intended 
the assignment to occur. Therefore, FMA did not "suffer" any 
encumbrance created by that assignment. The only adverse interest 
that FMA knew about was the trust deed to 4-Seasons, and FMA 
thought it had resolved 4-Seasons' interest when 4-Seasons stipu-
lated that the property could be sold by FMA free of 4-Seasons' 
claim. 
Because Citizens Bank's claim did not arise "by, through 
or under" FMA nor did FMA "suffer" the claim, FMA did not warrant 
against the claim and cannot be liable to Fidelity for its at-
torney's fees incurred in successfully challenging that claim. 
- 6 -
III. 
EVEN IF CITIZENS BANK'S CLAIM WAS COVERED BY THE 
SPECIAL WARRANTY DEED, THE DEED WARRANTY WAS NOT BREACHED. 
Even if FMA warranted against Citizens Bank's claim, 
it did not breach any warranty. 
Under Utah law, the grantor under a warranty deed makes 
the following covenants:** 
1. Covenant of Seisin. Courts have taken two views 
as to what constitutes a breach of the covenant of seisin. A 
minority of courts hold that the covenant is breached only if 
a third party is in possession at the time of the conveyance, 
even if the possession is tortious. The majority of courts hold 
that the covenant is also breached if the grantor does not own 
the estate specified or owns it subject to a lesser estate. 
See generally 6A R. Powell, supra note 6, S 900[2][a] at 81A-
132 & -133. There appear to be no Utah cases on point. Regard-
b
 See Utah Code Ann. S 57-1-12. Absent a statute, the 
creation of covenants is basically a matter of private contract. 
What covenants are included in a deed depend on the agreement 
of the parties. 6A R. Powell# The Law of Real Property I 900[1] 
at 81A-131 (rev. ed. 1989). In this case, FMA did not give Alta 
Ridge a statutory warranty deed but rather a special warranty 
deed. Nevertheless, FMA will assume for purposes of this appeal 
that the special warranty deed included the five statutory cove-
nants with respect to any claims "by, through, or under" FMA. 
The first three statutory covenants are present cove-
nants. If breached at all, they are breached when the warranty 
deed is delivered to the grantee. 2d. 15 896-98. The latter 
two covenants are future covenants, meaning that they can be 
breached only by some future action. See id. 11 899 & 900. 
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less of which view Utah would take, however, there was no breach 
of the covenant of seisin in this case. There was no evidence 
that Citizens Bank was in possession of the property at the time 
of the conveyance from FMA to Alta Ridge, and, in fact, Alta 
Ridge has been in possession of the property from the time of 
the conveyance to the present. Moreover, FMA in fact owned the 
estate that it conveyed, and the property was not subject to a 
lesser estate. Citizens Bank's claim based on an assignment of 
a trust deed was at best only a lien or encumbrance. See id. S 
900[2][c] at 81A-136 ("a mortgage lien is an encumbrance since 
it does not deny the passage of the seisin from the grantor to 
the grantee"). And "the fact that the estate is subject to an 
encumbrance . . . is not a breach of the covenant [of seisin]." 
Id. f 900[2] [a] at 81A-133 (footnote omitted). Moreover, Citizens 
Bank's claim was not even an encumbrance on the property. Citi-
zens Bank's claim was only as good as its assignor's, and the 
jury found that the trust deed from Dale Morgan to 4-Seasons, 
Citizens Bank's assignor, failed for lack of consideration. 
See Record at 843. 
2. Covenant of Right to Convey, The covenant of 
right to convey is a covenant that the grantor has the right to 
convey the property. It is coextensive with the covenant of 
seisin in those jurisdictions following the majority view of 
that covenant. It is breached by the existence of an outstanding 
- 8 -
paramount title at the time of conveyance. See 6A R. Powell, 
supra note 6, I 900[2][b]. It is undisputed in this case that 
FMA had the right to convey the property to Alta Ridge and that 
Citizens Bank had no title or interest in the property. Thus, 
there was no breach of the covenant of right to convey. 
3. Covenant Against Encumbrances. The covenant 
against encumbrances warrants that the premises are free from 
encumbrances and that the grantor will indemnify the grantee if 
he or she suffers any loss to the value of the premises due to 
the existence of an encumbrance. Id., f 900[2][c] at 81A-135 
(citation omitted). A mortgage lien is an encumbrance, and the 
existence of such a lien would violate the covenant. However, 
a lien "is a claim which is enforceable against the land if the 
obligation which it secures is not otherwise paid." Ici. at 81A-
137. There was no lien in this case because Citizens Bank's 
claim against the land was unenforceable* Where an encumbrance 
is unenforceable or one is successful in defending an action to 
enforce the encumbrance, no violation of the covenant occurs. 
Id. at 81A-138 & -139 (footnote omitted). Because FMA was suc-
cessful in defeating Citizen Bank's claimed encumbrance, there 
was no violation of the covenant against encumbrances, 
4. Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment. The covenant of 
quiet enjoyment assures the grantee that his or her quiet 
possession or enjoyment of the property will not be disturbed 
- 9 -
by the grantor or anyone else with paramount title. Id. f 900 
[2][e] at 81A-144. The covenant is breached by any interference 
with the grantee's title or usage of the property by one having 
paramount title. Because Citizen Bank had no interest in the 
property, there was no interference with Alta Ridge's possession 
or enjoyment of the property by one having paramount title and 
thus no breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment. 
5. Covenant of Warranty. *? Under the covenant of 
warranty, the grantor agrees to compensate the grantee for any 
loss that the grantee sustains by reason of a failure of the 
title or an encumbrance thereon and agrees to defend the title 
"against the lawful claims which may be asserted against it." 
Id. I 900[2][d] at 81A-139 (emphasis added and footnote omitted). 
Because Citizens Bank did not have a lawful, valid claim against 
the property, there was no breach of the covenant to warrant 
and defend title. In fact, FMA did defend title. It filed this 
action to enjoin Citizens Bank's wrongful, nonjudicial foreclosure 
and to quiet title in Alta Ridge, and it incurred substantial 
attorney's fees in the process. 
A breach of the covenant of warranty occurs "when, 
and only when, the grantee suffers an eviction under a paramount 
7
 The covenant of warranty and the covenant of quiet 
enjoyment are "fraternal, if not identical, twin[s]." 6A R. 
Powell, supra note 6, I 900[2][d] at 81A-144. A breach of one 
generally constitutes a breach of the other. 
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title." Id., at 81A-142 (footnote omitted). Accord Christiansen 
v. Utah-Idaho Sugar Co., 590 P.2d 1251, 1253 (Utah 1979) (to 
recover for a breach of covenant of warranty or a covenant against 
encumbrances, "the complaining party must show that he was evicted 
by one having the paramount title") (footnote omitted). The 
eviction may be either actual or constructive. 590 P.2d at 1253. 
An actual eviction occurs when an adverse party removes 
the grantee from possession or is already in possession on the 
date that the grantee acquires title to the property. 6A R. 
Powell, supra note 6, I 900[2][d] at 81A-143. Fidelity does not 
contend that Alta Ridge was actually evicted from the property. 
See Brief of Respondent at 16-19. Rather, Fidelity argues that 
Citizens Bank's foreclosure action constituted a constructive 
eviction of Alta Ridge. "A constructive eviction occurs when 
there is a positive assertion of a paramount title and the grantee 
rightfully yields to the holder of that title," even without an 
actual surrender of the premises. .Ici. " [U]nless there is a 
disturbance of the grantee's title, or the threat of a dis-
turbance, by the holder of paramount title. there can be no evic-
tion," £d. (footnote omitted and emphasis added). See also 
Christiansen. 590 P.2d at 1253. There was no eviction—either 
actual or constructive--in this case because Citizens Bank did 
not hold paramount title. In fact, it did not have any interest 
at all in the property. 
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In short, FMA did not breach any deed warranty, and 
the trial court erred in concluding that it had. 
None of the cases cited by Fidelity alters this con-
clusion. In each of those cases, the encumbrance either had 
been held valid, or its validity was not contested. See 
Christiansen v. Utah-Idaho Sugar Co., 590 P.2d 1251, 1253 (Utah 
1979) (no question regarding the validity of the encumbrance 
though there was a fact question regarding its abandonment); 
Creason v. Peterson, 24 Utah 2d 305, 470 P.2d 403, 405 (1970) 
(finding that there was at least "a technical defect" in the 
title); East Canyon Land & Stock Co* v. Davis & Weber Counties 
Canal Co. . 65 Utah 560, 566, 238 P. 280 (1925) (the court assumed 
that paramount title was in the United States); George A. Lowe 
Co. v. Simmons Warehouse Co., 39 Utah 395, 398, 117 P. 874 (1911) 
(holding that a claimed tax lien constituted a valid encumbrance); 
Chicago Mobile Dev. Co. v. G.C. Cooain Co., 259 Ala. 152, 66 
So.2d 151, 155 (1953); Camden County Welfare Bd. v. Federal De-
posit Ins. Co., 1 N.J. Super. 532, 62 A.2d 416, 422, 424 (1948); 
McCleary v. Bratton, 307 S.W.2d 722, 724 (Mo. App. 1957) (grantee 
unsuccessful in title defense). In this case, on the other hand, 
it is beyond dispute that Citizens Bank did not have a valid claim 
to the property. Therefore, Citizens Bank's claim did not breach 
- 12 -
any of FMA's deed warranties, even assuming that that claim came 
within FMA's warranties under the Special Warranty Deed.8 
Finally, Fidelity argues that the law ought to allow 
a grantee's insurer to recover the costs of a successful defense 
because otherwise a grantor would simply refuse to defend an 
action, gambling that his grantee would ultimately prevail.^ 
Regardless of the merits of Fidelity's policy argument, the argu-
ment is inapplicable in this case because FMA did not refuse to 
defend Alta Ridge's title but filed this action challenging Citi-
zens Bank's claim and incurred substantial costs as a result. 
Because Fidelity's argument is inapplicable under the facts of 
this case, the court need not consider it. 
8 Interestingly, while all of the cases Fidelity cites 
are distinguishable, Fidelity does not even mention, let alone 
distinguish, the authorities FMA has cited to show that, absent 
an eviction, deed warranties are not breached by a successful 
defense of a third party's claim. See, e.g., Chaney v. Haeder. 
90 Or. App. 321, 752 P.2d 854 (1988); Double L. Properties. Inc. 
v. Crandall, 51 Wash. App. 149, 751 P.2d 1208 (1988). 
9 The same policy concerns militate against Fidelity's 
position. If a title insurer were entitled to recover its attor-
ney's fees from its insured's grantor even where, as here, the 
grantor successfully defends its grantee's title, the title in-
surer would have no incentive to search or defend title where 
it was dealing with a solvent grantor. 
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IV. 
FIDELITY IS NOT ENTITLED TO ITS DEFENSE COSTS FROM FMA. 
The basis for the trial court's award of attorney's 
fees to Fidelity (as opposed to Alta Ridge) was that Fidelity 
was subrogated to Alta Ridge's rights against FMA. Thus, the 
court must first determine whether Alta Ridge had any right to 
recover its attorney's fees from FMA. 
The only basis that the trial court found for an award 
of attorney's fees was FMA's alleged breach of its deed warran-
ties. For the reasons stated in point III, supra, FMA did not 
breach any deed warranty. But even if FMA had breached a deed 
covenant, under Utah law Alta Ridge would not be entitled to 
recover its attorney's fees. 
Where there is a breach of a deed covenant, the grantee 
is entitled to recover his "costs" incurred as a result of the 
breach. Van Cott v. Jacklin, 63 Utah 412, 419, 226 P. 460 
(1924). However, the authorities are "in hopeless conflict upon 
the question of when and upon what conditions a covenantee may 
recover attorney fees against his vendor.M Id. at 420. In Van 
Cott, the Utah Supreme Court followed those decisions that allow 
a covenantee to recover attorney fees "where the covenantee in 
good faith and after notice to his grantor . . . [and] upon 
neglect and refusal of his grantor to put him in possession, 
. . . institute!s] proceedings to obtain such possession . . ." 
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.M
 63 Utah at 421 (quoting Walsh v. Dunn. 34 111. App. 146) (em-
phasis added). See also Creason v. Peterson, 24 Utah 2d 305, 
470 P.2d 403, 403, 405-06 (1970) (allowing a grantee to recover 
attorney fees incurred as a result of his grantor's breach of 
deed warranties where the grantor failed to cure the title de-
fect). Here, however, when FMA was notified of Citizens Bank's 
claim, it undertook to prosecute an action to quiet title in 
its grantee, Alta Ridge, and incurred substantial attorney's 
fees as a result. The fact that Fidelity joined in the action 
and also incurred attorney's fees does not give rise to any claim 
by Alta Ridge against FMA. Rather, Fidelity incurred its fees 
as a result of its efforts to fulfill its own, independent obli-
gation to its insured, Alta Ridge, under the terms of its title 
insurance policy. The fact that both Fidelity and FMA may have 
had independent obligations to defend Alta Ridge's title simply 
means that Alta Ridge was doubly protected, and the fact that 
both fulfilled any obligation they may have had to Alta Ridge 
shows that Alta Ridge in fact suffered no damage as a result of 
FMA's actions or inaction and thus has no claim against FMA to 
which Fidelity could be subrogated. 
Moreover, Alta Ridge's cross-claim only sought judgment 
against FMA "in the event Citizens is awarded judgment or allowed 
. . . to proceed with sale of the Property." Record at 268. 
It is undisputed that Citizens Bank was neither awarded judgment 
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nor allowed to proceed with its sale of the Property. Thus, 
there was no basis in the pleadings for any judgment against 
FMA on Alta Ridge's cross-claim. 
Finally, Alta Ridge could only recover attorney fees 
if it had paid them or had become legally obligated to pay them. 
Van Cott v. Jacklin, 63 Utah 412, 420, 226 P. 460 (1924). It 
is undisputed that Alta Ridge did not pay any attorney fees. 
See Brief of Respondent at 24 & n.4. Moreover, under the terms 
of its title insurance policy, Fidelity—not Alta Ridge—was 
legally obligated to pay for the defense of Alta Ridge's title. 
The policy states: "The Company [Fidelity] shall have the right 
at its own cost to institute and . . . prosecute any action or 
proceeding or to do any other act which in its opinion may be 
necessary or desirable to establish the title to the estate or 
interest as insured . . . ." Brief of Respondent addenda 
at 29 f 3(c) (emphasis added). The policy further provides: "In 
all cases where this policy permits or requires the Company 
[Fidelity] to prosecute . . . any action or proceeding, the in-
sured hereunder [Alta Ridge] . • • shall give the Company all 
reasonable aid in any such action or proceeding . . . , and the 
Company shall reimburse such insured for any expense so incurred." 
Id. f 3(e) (emphasis added). Thus, under the very terms of its 
own title insurance policy, Fidelity—not Alta Ridge—was legally 
obligated to pay the costs it incurred in this action. Because 
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Alta Ridge did not have any obligation to pay Fidelity's attorney 
fees incurred in this action, Fidelity did not discharge any 
debt owed by Alta Ridge and, under principles of subrogation, 
is not entitled to recover its attorney fees from FMA. 
Fidelity apparently concedes that it is not equitably 
subrogated to any right of Alta Ridge to recover its attorney's 
fees from FMA. See Brief of Respondent at 22. Instead, it argues 
that it is subrogated to the rights of Alta Ridge under the ex-
press terms of the title insurance policy, which states: 
Whenever [Fidelity] shall have settled a 
claim under this policy, all right of sub-
rogation shall vest in [Fidelity] unaffected 
by any act of the insured claimant [Alta 
Ridge]. [Fidelity] shall be subrogated to 
and be entitled to all rights and remedies 
which such insured claimant would have had 
against any person or property in respect 
to such claim had this policy not been issued 
. . . . 
See Brief of Respondent addenda at 35 I 11. 
Fidelity's contractual right of subrogation is limited 
to claims that Fidelity has "settled" under its policy of title 
insurance. The meaning of the word "settle" depends on the con-
text. Black's Law Dictionary 1230 (5th ed. 1979). Fidelity's 
title insurance policy was a standard American Land Title Associ-
ation (ALTA) owner's policy. See Brief of Respondent addenda 
at 28. Commenting on paragraph 11 (the subrogation provision) 
of such policies, one commentator has stated that the insurer 
is subrogated to the rights of the insured "in the event the 
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insurer makes a payment in satisfaction of a claim under the 
policy." M. Rooney, Attorney's Guide to Title Insurance at 4-
40 (1984) (emphasis added). Fidelity did not make any payment 
in satisfaction of any claim of Alta Ridge. Thus, Fidelity did 
not "settle" any claim and is not subrogated under the policy 
to any rights of Alta Ridge, even if Alta Ridge did have some 
right to recover attorney's fees from FMA. 
Fidelity argues that, by preventing the foreclosure 
of Citizens Bank and obtaining a final determination that Citizens 
Bank's claim was invalid, Fidelity "settled" that claim within 
the meaning of the policy. However, it cites no authority for 
this proposition, and in all of the cases cited by Fidelity in 
which a right of subrogation was recognized, the insurer in fact 
paid off a lien against the property or a claim against its in-
sured (as opposed to defeating a lien or successfully defending 
such a claim). See Transamerica Title Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 103 
Wash. 2d 409, 693 P.2d 697, 698 (1985); Skaucre v. Mountain States 
Tel. & Tel. Co., 172 Mont. 521, 565 P.2d 628, 629 (1977). 
For its argument, Fidelity relies on two cases, neither 
of which involved insurance and neither of which is on point. 
The issue in Yancev v. Yancev, 230 N.C. 719, 55 S.E.2d 468 (1949), 
was whether a judgment entered after a settlement was a deter-
mination on the merits. The court held that it was. 55 S.E.2d 
at 470. It is one thing to say that a judgment based on a set-
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tlement is a decision on the merits. It is quite another to 
say that all decisions on the merits are the settlement of a 
claim.10 In the second case, The Brazil (United States v. The 
Brazil^, 134 F.2d 929 (7th Cir. 1943), the issue was whether a 
libel was barred by the statute of limitations. The statute 
under which the government proceeded in filing the libel provided 
that all forfeitures could be "disposed of" in the same manner 
as forfeitures in actions to collect a duty. The court stated, 
"'To dispose' of a matter is to arrange or settle it finally; 
to determine the fate or fix the condition of; to finish with; 
to adjust, settle and determine a matter." 134 F.2d at 931. 
The court held that the statute prescribing the manner of dis-
position of a statutory right to forfeiture also prescribed when 
the cause of action accrued. Id. Fidelity's argument—namely, 
that an insurer "settles" a case whenever the case is "disposed 
of"—stretches the policy language beyond the breaking point.11 
1 0
 As Lincoln noted, by such an argument one could "prove 
a horse chestnut to be a chestnut horse.H C. Sandburg, Abraham 
Lincoln: The Prairie Years and the War Years 142 (1-vol. ed. 
1954) . 
1 1
 Fidelity's argument from synonyms for words taken out 
of context is reminiscent of Dromio of Syracuse's argument for 
why light wenches burn. Speaking of a courtesan, he said: 
[S]he is the devil's dam, and here she comes 
in the habit of a light wench; and thereof 
comes that the wenches say, "God damn me;" 
that's as much as to say, "God make me a 
light wench." It is written, they appear 
to men like angels of light: light is an 
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Fidelity's argument would allow an insurer to recover its attor-
ney's fees even where the disposition of the case was against 
the insurer, for example, where the case was dismissed (i.e., 
"disposed of") for the insurer's failure to prosecute. 
In short, Fidelity's subrogation argument is not sup-
ported by either the plain language of the policy or common sense. 
But even if Fidelity were subrogated to the rights of its insured 
under the policy, it is clear that Alta Ridge had no claim against 
FMA for attorney's fees. 
V. 
FMA'S THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT PRECLUDED ENFORECMENT 
OF THE TRIAL COURT'S GRANT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
Fidelity argues that FMA's third-party complaint does 
not preclude enforcement of the trial court's order because FMA's 
damages, if any, are unliquidated and because Fidelity should not 
be required to wait indefinitely for the enforcement of its judg-
ment. 
FMA's third-party complaint sought indemnification 
from Fidelity in the event the court found FMA liable and sought 
its costs of suit incurred in this action. Record at 354. Be-
cause FMA'8 defense of Alta Ridge's title was successful, FMA's 
effect of fire, and fire will burn; ergo, 
light wenches will burn. 
W. Shakespeare, Comedy of Errors, act V, scene iii, lines 50-
57. 
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only damages are the attorney's fees awarded to Fidelity and 
FMA's own fees incurred herein. The former amount is liquidated, 
and, if FMA is successful on its third-party complaint, that 
amount will completely offset Fidelity's award of damages. 
In the interest of equity, the trial court should have 
adjudicated FMA's and Fidelity's respective rights in one pro-
ceeding. Although FMA's third-party complaint was filed in Decem-
ber 1983, FMA was not damaged until the trial court entered its 
order awarding Fidelity its attorney's fees, on March 31, 1989. 
To have postponed execution of Fidelity's summary judgment to 
allow FMA to litigate the question of any offset would not have 
unreasonably delayed enforcement of Fidelity's judgment. On 
the other hand, by not postponing execution of that judgment, 
FMA could be required to pay an obligation that may be more than 
offset by FMA's recovery under its third-party complaint. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court erred in 
concluding that Fidelity could recover its attorney fees from 
FMA. As Fidelity notes, "the law ought not to fail in dispensing 
justice" (lex deficere non potest in iustitia exhibenda). Brief 
of Respondent at 20. Where both the grantor and the title insurer 
have an independent obligation to defend the title of their 
grantee and insured, respectively, and both incur attorney fees 
in successfully fulfilling their obligations, the just result 
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under long-standing principles of American law would be to let 
each bear its own attorney's fees. By requiring FMA to pay 
Fidelity's attorney's fees as well as its own, the trial court 
failed in dispensing justice, and its order should be reversed. 
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